Let us invite you to read an interesting publication entitled "1944 Warsaw Uprising 50 years after". Its author, late Prof. Dr Tomasz Strzembosz, a professor at the Institute of Political Studies Polish Academy of Sciences and at the Catholic University of Lublin, a scholar of the history of Poland of World War II, devoted a dozen of books to study this subject.
          The publication got into our hands by courtesy of Jędrzej Bukowski, the first non-Communist Consul General of Poland in Lille, France. As part of his activities, he compiled and published a bi-lingual (Polish and French) newsletter of the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Lille. The newsletter was then duplicated by the city council of Lille. 20 editions of the bulletin had been published up to 1995. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of 1944 Warsaw Uprising, a special 9th (19th) 66-page edition of this publication devoted entirely to the insurrection was released in 1995. The publication contained, among others, Prof. Strzembosz's article submitted by the Department of Press and Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
          20 years have passed since then, but it has lost none of its relevance.

Maciej Janaszek-Seydlitz

1944 Warsaw Uprising 50 years after


          I do not know why a well-known historian of the Uprising, Prof. Dr Jan Ciechanowski, the author of the monography "Warsaw Uprising. An outline of the political and diplomatic background" (London 1974, Warsaw 1984), began his deliberations over the origins of the battle in Warsaw from July 1943. The summer of 1943 marked no event that could have triggered the Uprising itself or that would have had a more substantial impact on the decision to start the Uprising and the fate of Warsaw.
          The important dates for the Uprising, besides, of course, September 1, 1939, the day of the German invasion of Poland, include::
          - September 8 - 28, 1939 - the defense of Warsaw that had a significant impact not only on the September campaign of 1939, but also on the attitude and conduct of Warsaw residents;
          - dates of round-ups carried out by the German police in the city, followed by deportations of victims to concentration camps to meet death;
          - dates of executions and armed clashes with the occupant that can be construed as moral and psychological preparations for the main confrontation;
          - but also the days of September 17, 1939, and April 25, 1943.
          Why them as well?
          The Warsaw Uprising of 1944 took place in a major city being at the same time the capital of the country, and therefore it could have been viewed as a local event, an episode in the Polish-German war, one of many uprisings in capital cities of occupied Europe.
          In reality it had a broader dimension as it was set in the triangle: independent (though temporarily occupied) Poland - Nazi Germany - the Soviet Union subjected to the authoritarian rule of Stalin.
          The conflict between those three subjects of international law, which found its expression in Warsaw in the act of Uprising on August 1, 1944, manifested itself fully on September 17, 1939, when "the best Hitler's ally", as the Soviets were called by one of historians in the West [1], launched an attack on Poland desperately defending itself against the Germans.
          The consequence of this event was the partition of the country: Stalin took over almost 52% of its territory, while Hitler - over 48%, except that according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 23, 1939, Stalin was to gain much more, i.e. almost 2/3 of the area.
          The USSR never renounced those spoils of war, not then, not in the period of July 1941 - April 1943, before they broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish government (which they re-established on July 30, 1941 in the face of serious losses inflicted by the Germans), let alone after their severance on April 25, 1943. They never did!
          The partition of Poland carried out in cooperation with Nazi Germany was to be a permanent fact. Poland lost half of its territory, and the potential compensations from Germany were not certain, nor were they indisputable. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact made our country dependent on the USSR and put us into conflict with Germany, regardless of its status in the future. It was also reasonable to suspect that the Soviet Union would strive to make Poland even more dependent. Molotov's words about Poland being "the monstrous bastard of the Treaty of Versailles" resounded until spring 1941, and their echo could be heard in various statements of the Leader of the First Proletariat State, incessantly criticizing the Polish Government-in-exile and other authorities of the Republic of Poland.
          And it was this basic situation: the Soviet annexation of the Polish territory in collaboration with the Germans and its joint occupation until "the German treason" (June 22, 1941), the terrible fate of Poles living under the Soviet rule in the eastern part of Poland (1939-1941), combined with massive deportations of a few hundred thousand Polish citizens into the Soviet interior, incarcerations of another couple hundred thousand, plus executions of at least several thousand Polish officers and soldiers [2] taken prisoner often without any armed resistance - all this had to be taken into account when undertaking the decision about the Uprising in the capital of Poland.
          The decision was made when the Red Army was once more crossing the borders of Poland in summer 1944, while the countries in the West, satisfied with the fact that the Soviets had taken on their shoulders most of war effort in Europe, were ready, similarly as in Munich in the past [3], to make concessions, especially if those concessions were at the expense of small Central European countries. Germany, at the same time, still dangerous and threatening to make use of its new "wonder-weapon" [4], was dragging the war out by putting up fierce resistance and was still able to deal blows to the Allied armies even half a year later (e.g. in the Ardennes).
          In July 1944 another "leader" was entering Poland, the boss of a totalitarian "super empire", who after the victory at Stalingrad in January 1943 had regained confidence to make further annexations, and who had been preparing for this move by severing diplomatic relations with the Polish Government-in-exile in April 1943 [5]. As a consequence, the Government ceased to be a partner and more than ever turned into an object of foreign intentions.
          Simultaneously, the United States, the greatest power of the West, seemed to be on Stalin's leash (as it was suggested through the conference of the Big Three in Tehran in November/December 1943), while Great Britain, diminishing in power and fearing that the Polish "impracticability" would expose it to an undesired conflict with the USSR, incapacitated the Polish Government in London by censoring its letters and Prime Minister's radio announcements.
          This incapacitation of the Government and other authorities in exile, and their awareness of things quickly heading in the wrong direction, forced the executives of the conspiratorial center of military and political control in the country (the leaders of the Polish Underground State) to take matters into their own hands and to make the last attempt at becoming an entity, not an object, in new Europe in statu nascendi. For the Polish authorities such an act of sovereignty was the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.
          However, by liberating the capital as a result of the Uprising, by setting up the National Committee of the Council of Ministers (Deputy Prime Minister and three ministers of the Polish Government), by revealing the conspiratorial Polish Armed Forces (the Home Army), the Council of National Unity (the underground parliament), judiciary, police, social and political institutions, and at the same time by offering a large bridgehead on the Western bank of the Vistula (being the greatest water barrier before the Oder River) and the largest transport hub in Poland to the Red Army for free - all this entailed a serious danger.
          The Uprising posed a challenge to the USSR authorities and to the Soviet-backed Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN). For it was here, in Warsaw, not in Lublin, the freshly liberated seat of PKWN appointed by Moscow, where the highest Polish authorities recognized by the West were installed, where the heart of the country was beating, where a piece of independent Poland could be found.
          The Uprising, striking Germany back, constituted a barricade to the Soviet plan of "peaceful conquer" of Central and Eastern Europe, a barricade that could be crushed or bypassed but that could not be ignored.


          It is generally believed that the decision about the Uprising was made by the Home Army Commander General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski on July 31, 1944 at six o'clock p.m. In reality, the decision was taken by wider groups of officials in Warsaw, and also in London.
          The conclusion that the fight in Warsaw was a necessity was reached in the second half of July 1944 in the Home Army Headquarters and it gained support of domestic political authorities: the Presidium of the Council of National Unity, and the Government Delegate for Poland - Deputy Prime Minister. On July 25, the concept was approved by the Polish Government-in-exile.
          Practically nobody expressed any reservations despite the fact that the decisive bodies were multi-party and differed in their perspectives on dozens of political matters. Here, they were surprisingly unanimous [6], although they all knew that if Warsaw burnt down, they all would go down with it. If the Russians started arresting "the culprits" after marching into the city, they would be the first to be taken into custody.
          Similarly, the final decision on the evening of July 31 was not made by the Home Army Commander, but by the Government Delegate for Poland. Based on his report and opinion, the order to initiate the Uprising - the W hour - was signed by the Commander of the Home Army Warsaw Circuit, Colonel Antoni Chruściel - aka "Monter" ("Assembler"). He ordered to begin the fights on August 1 at five o'clock p.m.


          The Warsaw Uprising is sometimes justly called "the uprising of boys and girls", for it was they who independently and autonomically decided to report, or not, to the designated assembly point and to take part in the fight.
          Warsaw did not have any barracks. Each soldier took the decision in the privacy of their homes, in front of their mothers, wives or fiancées. However, as this decision was made by around 30 000 people, later followed by those who for various reasons could not stand to fight on August 1, and then by another thousands of volunteers, the Uprising turned into an act of such magnitude that it encompassed the whole city and lasted several times longer than anticipated - 63 days.
          The Uprising went through a few stages. The first phase [7] was a simultaneous attack on the positions occupied by the Germans. The assault, carried out in Śródmieście, Mokotów, Wola, Żoliborz, and Praga, took the Germans by surprise, though for the last few days they had been anticipating an uprising or riot. The fact that the action started not at dawn but during the heaviest traffic helped to camouflage troop concentrations.
          However, in view of the fact that the insurgents were poorly armed, they were not able to take the most important fortified positions, including two bridges across the Vistula, or the "German district" - the headquarters of the German authorities. The success was not possible because of bunkers that had been under construction here since fall 1943, and because the buildings had been turned into heavy-defended fortresses. Still, as a result of the attack the Germans were cut off and kept in isolated strongholds. The SS and police commander on Aleja Szucha was cut off from the commander of the German forces and the Governor of the Warsaw District near Theatre Square.
          This first attack was in progress for the next 2-3 days [8], then the insurgents moved into defense position.
          The first critical moment of the Uprising, when the fates of the insurgents were at stake following a potential German counterattack, passed without greater problems owing to the lucky moment of commencing the Uprising. As it turned out, the day of August 1 was a dramatic climax in a great armored battle taking place from July 30 to August 5 east of Warsaw, between Wołomin and Radzymin (in the area of the Battle of Warsaw of 1920), of which the insurgents were only partially aware. The Germans were not able to withdraw not even one of their tank regiments out of their five armored divisions to suppress the Uprising.
          Later, when the Germans dealt a blow to the Soviet 2nd Guards Tank Army and the situation near Warsaw fell under their control, they were forced to shift the burden of fights far to the south of Warsaw. On July 29, the 3rd and 13th Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front began to cross the Vistula near Annopol and Baranów, while the 1st Belorussian Front, commanded by Marshal K. Rokossovsky, having reached the Vistula near Puławy, crossed the river on July 29, expanding the bridgehead in this area.
          It was exactly on August 1 at two o'clock a.m. when the 8th Guards Army, 69th Army and the First Polish Army began to cross the Vistula along the broad front. This move did not bring any success, but the Warka-Magnuszew bridgehead formed as a result of this action constituted a great threat to the Germans, attracting most of Wehrmacht forces. As early as on August 4, the Germans redeployed the 19th Panzer Division "Herman Göring" to this area, and on August 8 even more German forces arrived to organize a massive strike.
          Thanks to this course of events it was not Wehrmacht but a special group, since August 5 under the command of SS General Erich von dem Bach, that received the order to suppress the Warsaw Uprising. The group was made up of different police units, the SS, the so-called Ostlegions, the Russian Liberation Army troops etc., and was heavily supported by air force, tanks, artillery, and horrible experimental weapons, such as 610 mm railway guns Karl-Gerät, multi-barrel mortars (nicknamed "screaming cows" or "wardrobes" by the insurgents), or "goliaths", electrically powered caterpillar mini vehicles carrying explosives, used to demolish buildings and fortifications.
          When the first days of the Polish attack had passed, the Germans began to regroup their forces on the outskirts of Warsaw and they eventually launched a counteroffensive, concentrating their efforts on destroying the successive insurgent clusters. On August 6 they took over Wola, on August 11 they destroyed two strongpoints in Ochota and captured Powązki, thus isolating and surrounding the Old Town, which since the second half of August was under particularly strong pressure and defended itself even more fiercely.
          In September, the fights were concentrated in Powiśle, and after its capture (September 6, 1944) in Górny Czerniaków. Having destroyed the bridgehead in Czerniaków [9], the Germans directed their forces to Mokotów, which was forced to surrender on September 27.
          Żoliborz capitulated 3 days later under the force of the 19th Panzer Division. In view of lack of any support, fearing a terrible fate awaiting the civilian population, and because of ammo shortage, General Bór-Komorowski decided to surrender the rest of the city. The capitulation took place on October 2, after 63 days of fights.
          The military undertaking took a heavy toll on the Home Army and other Polish military organizations: 18 000 killed and ca. 25 000 injured. Civilian casualties amounted to 200 000 people.
          The three and a half months that separated the capitulation of the Uprising from capturing the ruins of the capital of Poland by the Red Army on January 17, 1945, gave the Germans time to conduct a systematic block-by-block leveling of left-bank Warsaw: during the Uprising 25% of buildings were destroyed, and another 35% shared the same fate after the Uprising as a result of German demolition on purpose.
          The war damage in Warsaw amounted to 85% of all buildings in total, including the destructions related to the city defense in 1939 and the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.
          The Germans casualties were estimated at 10 000 soldiers killed, 7000 lost, and 9 000 injured.

The capital of the Republic of Poland

          During the fights the insurgents were able to fully recreate the state administration in those districts of Warsaw that were not destroyed at once, as it happened to Wola or Ochota. These were mainly: Śródmieście, Żoliborz, the Old Town, and Powiśle.
          The bodies that were functioning included: the Government Delegation for Poland (especially at district and city levels), whose responsibility was to steer the work of those civil services that still remained underground and those established spontaneously during the Uprising, public order and safety organs (National Security Corps), Polish Socialist Party Militia, "Order and Safety" in Mokotów, Military Police.
          Also active (and often well organized) were rear services: the Military Service for the Protection of the Uprising (WSOP) and its departments: fire-fighting, technical and constructive. Social service organizations were functioning as well, including childcare organizations.
          Other services that were active included: complex sanitary service, civil services responsible for food supply, and military quartermaster's, but also printing houses and newspaper offices: ordinances, including the Government Delegate's (Deputy Prime Minister's) decrees, were published and disseminated. Some districts in certain periods of time even enjoyed cultural life - concerts, filmmakers' shows, posters. Special military and civil courts started to operate with some delay.
          The system was fully democratic: national printing houses published papers of the radical and oppositional Communist Polish Workers' Party, but also those of syndicalists, radical socialists, and nationalists. Home Army soldiers fought should to shoulder with soldiers of the National Armed Forces, Polish Syndicalist Combat Organization, Polish People's Army, and People's Army.
          The military mail was working well - organized by scouts, it provided services also to civilian population. Fire victims were taken care of. Political parties were only modestly active, which is understandable taken into consideration the time of war - e.g. they published their own press [10]. Military and civil chaplaincy provided pastoral support.
          Besides the army, also the political executives of the Polish Underground State had a considerable impact on the fate of the Uprising: the Government Delegation for Poland (the Council of Ministers at Home), the Council of National Unity (the underground parliament).
          Those 63 days of freedom, the freedom from the occupant, were also 63 days of freedom in social and political sphere. Despite the constant threat and fight for life in its biological sense, no military dictatorship arose. As the Government Delegate (Deputy Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-exile) ultimately decided about the outbreak of the Uprising, so he had the final word about its definitive capitulation. The long-term preparations for the Uprising (which was to be a common uprising, encompassing the whole country) and the famous Polish capability of improvising and self-organization played a major role and were merged together in the "inner" life of thr million-inhabitant city.

The question of support for the Uprising

          The real, and not symbolic, support for the Uprising could only arrive from the East. Weapon, ammo, food and supply drops from far-away Great Britain or equally distant Italy (air base in Brindisi) were almost suicide missions, especially in view of the fact that Stalin did not allow Allied planes to land behind the Eastern frontline, not even the damaged ones!
          Even the support that Warsaw began to receive from the East since mid-September, when the Uprising was already bleeding to death, was of symbolic and propaganda nature and constituted a camouflage for hostile actions. The deployment of the Polish forces made up of only two rifle companies, without any preparations (because of rushing orders from the 1st Belorussian Front), with almost no heavy weapon, without tanks, which could not be transported because of lack of crossing means (!), but which were at the enemy's disposal [11], to three different places (to Czerniaków, between the Poniatowski and Średnicowy Bridges, and near Żoliborz) in only three days, i.e. from 16 to 18 September, could not produce any positive results, but only cost a few thousand human beings.
          Such a small size of the operation targeted directly at Warsaw stood in stark contract with the crossings organized near Sandomierz and Puławy, involving whole armies of soldiers!
          An operation of surrounding Warsaw from south and north, which was to begin on August 25 and which would lead to the liberation of the city, was postulated by Marshal Rokossovsky on August 8 in his letter to Stalin, but it was not carried out!
          Stalin forbade this intervention and shifted the main force of the attack on the Balkans. He stopped the front in Poland by, among others, conducting a large crossing operation near Puławy to a much smaller bridgehead near Magnuszew, only to capture the left bank of the Vistula River instead of opening the way to the West.
          By this decision Stalin abandoned Warsaw, the bridgehead on the left bank of the Vistula, taken for "free", the last great water barrier before the Oder, a large and important communication hub in the middle part of the Eastern front, the shortest way to Berlin. In this way Stalin effectively postponed the capture of the German capital, and so the end of the war.
          Let us just add that an operation similar to the one blocked by Stalin, who stopped Rokossovsky from its commencing in August 1944, led to the liberation of Warsaw, or, to be more precise, its debris, on January 17, 1945.

The meaning of the Uprising

          The Warsaw Uprising of 1944 was in fact part of a wider operation nicknamed "Tempest", whose purpose was to push back the retreating German forces along the whole line of the Eastern front across Poland.
          Following the battle or skirmish with the Germans, the Home Army field commander together with the field Government delegate was to report, as the host, to the Soviet commander to agree on further joint activities.
          The Tempest operation, which began in Volhynia in February 1944 and continued throughout the spring as the front was moving west, was used by the Russians. It particularly came in handy whenever the Germans inflicted serious losses on the Soviets. This happened in Volhynia to the Home Army 27th Infantry Division, and to other larger Home Army troops in the Lublin region and in the east of Masovia. After the fights the commanders of the troops were usually arrested, while the soldiers - detained.
          All this happened by tacit consent of the West pretending not to see, while Stalin accused the Home Army of collaborating with the Germans. This is why the capital had to fight for freedom.
          But the Uprising was not just special part of the "Tempest" operation. It was also a battle taking place in the triangle: independent, though occupied Poland (i.e. the Polish Underground State and its central authorities in exile), Adolf Hitler's Germany and Joseph Stalin's USSR. It was a battle indirectly involving the diplomacies of the Western countries that entailed more than just freedom of Warsaw or even Poland.
          The Warsaw Uprising was another skirmish between the freedom of the human being and its right to decide for him/herself, between the democratic principles based on the Christian concept of the human being and his/her inherent rights, and totalitarianism that rejected those rights and that, in the name of some illusory ideas (racist or class), strove to turn a human being into a slave, a cog in the state system, merely a "producer" or "mulch" for future generations.
          If one does not perceive the Uprising in this way, he/she might miss the point of the drama that took place in the city. Similarly as the fight for freedom and survival of Sarajevo was something more than just a local conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the global indifference to the Rwandan genocide or vivid reactions to the events in oil-gushing Kuwait are the standards of values recognized by the modern world. Similarly to the Munich Agreement in 1938, which was much more than just the partition of Czechoslovakia, the Warsaw Uprising was, and still remains, a European matter of far-reaching consequences, affecting not only Poland. Its failure preceded the Yalta Conference and showed Stalin and his collaborators how far they still could go not only in matters related directly to Poland.
          But the Uprising should also be viewed from the purely Polish perspective. From the perspective of its impact on the attitude of Poles over the course of the next 50 years, on the role of its tradition, myth and legend in Poles' reliving their own past. On its influence on the Polish sense of identity, on their approach to the idea of sovereignty - in short, from the perspective of self-awareness and long-term historical structures.
          Both perspectives "along" and "across", together with the interpretation of the Uprising as one of battles for the spiritual, and not just geographical, shape of Europe, especially East-Central Europe, give adequate importance to the military undertaking in the capital of Poland, to the event that back in 1945 was called "the Warsaw battle".
          Still, new aspects of the Uprising remain to be discovered when looking at it from the perspective of half a century. A question arises: was it a lost battle?
          One thing is certain: even if the Uprising had not broken out, Warsaw would have been destroyed and the majority of its population massacred. It would have happened as a result of unavoidable and chaotic skirmishes during the population evacuation planned by the Germans after the victorious armored battle near the city (July 30 - August 5, 1944).
          It would have taken place as a result of multi-day fights in the city, suggested by Moscow radio stations at the end of July 1944, when Warsaw inhabitants were being encouraged to rebel against the Germans. Last but not least, it would have happened following an uprising organized by the Communist People's Army, which had been preparing for this move for some time.
          It would have taken place as a result of multi-day fights in the city, suggested by Moscow radio stations at the end of July 1944, when Warsaw inhabitants were being encouraged to rebel against the Germans. Last but not least, it would have happened following an uprising organized by the Communist People's Army, which had been preparing for this move for some time.
          Hitler's order of August 1 to murder all Warsaw residents, even though it was still unknown if what was happening in Warsaw was an organized uprising or just another social unrest, is a suggestive fact, similarly to the order of razing Warsaw to the ground given after the fights, when the frontline "stopped" on the Vistula river and the city was deserted by its inhabitants.
          The Warsaw Uprising, the last in the sequence of Polish national uprisings, starting with the Kościuszko Uprising in 1794, all of them involving the fight for the capital of Poland and its long-term defense, tells us something, is a very "telling" fact. It requires further studies, but this time also with the help of the Soviet sources, which have not been revealed to this day and which could possibly shed some new light on the matter at hand.

Tomasz Strzembosz


           [1] - Aleksander Bergman. The best Hitler's ally. A study on German-Soviet collaboration 1939-1941. London 1958 (reprints 1967, 1974).
[2] - According to the documents obtained in 1992 from the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation, in spring 1940 Moscow became the place of execution of not only over 14 500 officers, officials, policemen, soldiers of the Border Corps etc., detained in 3 prison camps in Starobilsk, Kozelsk and Ostashkov, but also over 7000 other people (of similar categories) imprisoned on the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus - in total almost 22 000 people.
[3] - Believing that in this way they would keep the global peace, European superpowers Great Britain and France concluded an agreement with Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy on September 30, 1938. The agreement provided for the German annexation of a large part of Czechoslovakia without the latter's participation in the conference and without its approval. This not only paved the way for Germany to later seize the whole of Czechoslovakia without firing a gun (in March 1939), but it also did not prevent World War II in Europe.
[4] - "Wunderwaffe" - this is how the Germans called their weapons of massive destruction, such as V1 or V2 rockets, and especially nuclear weapon, secretly under construction in Germany in the last phase of the war.
[5] - An excuse for severing diplomatic relations with Poland by the Soviet diplomacy were Polish attempts to identify the perpetrator of the mass executions of Polish officers in the Katyn forest, revealed by the Germans in April 1943. At that time the Western countries already knew that the USSR should be held responsible for the massacre, but they decided to hide this fact for temporary benefits, keeping the best possible relations with Stalin, the owner of the largest army in the anti-Hitler coalition, and they urged the Polish Government in London not to disturb the coalition's harmony with its actions.
[6] - All decision-making centers in the country and in exile were notified about the decision to start the Uprising, but the final decision to begin the fights on August 1 at five o'clock p.m. was made independently by the Government Delegate for Poland (which was due to the absence of Kazimierz Pużak, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of National Unity), based on the report of the Home Army Commander General Tadeusz Komorowski "Bór" ("Forest"). The only adamant opponent to this decision was Colonel Janusz Bokszczanin, head of one of the departments of the Home Army Headquarters.
[7] - A distinctive trait that set the Warsaw Uprising apart from other uprisings in European capitals, especially the one in Paris, was the fact that it broke out simultaneously all over the city, except for Żoliborz where the Germans had discovered a conspiratorial armed group of insurgents early at 2:30 p.m. and carried out a police action by sending there motorized Schupo forces.
[8] - Taking advantage of the tactical surprise of the Germans, the insurgents attacked their positions until the moment when the Germans were able to organize relief forces and launch a counteroffensive that had to be opposed by a large group of better armed troops.
[9] - A small area in the vicinity of Okrąg - Wilanowska and Solec Streets on the very bank of the Vistula, captured by the Home Army in early September and held by the Home Army Kedyw deployed here after the fall of the Old Town. On September 16, small (less than two battalions) landing forces of the 9th Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division of the First Polish Army reached this area after crossing the river.
[10] - These were not only the four parties constituting the political core of the Polish Government in London and the political authorities in the country (the People's Party, Polish Socialist Party, National Party, and Labor Party), but also oppositional parties, the National Radical Camp ONR-ABC ("Szaniec" "Rampart" Group), ONR-Falanga (Confederation of the Nation), the socially radical Polish Socialist Workers Party, the Union of Polish Syndicalists, the Communist Polish Workers Party, and other of minor importance.
[11] - Over the course of the whole operation only seventeen 45 mm guns (equipment of infantry regiments) were transported across the Vistula to its left bank (plus several dozen grenade launchers and 82 mm mortars). Not one out of 102 tanks and assault guns owned by the First Polish Army was delivered across the river.

translated by: Beata Murzyn

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